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1  Introduction 
 
Performance tables for UK secondary schools have been published annually since 1992.  
In 2003, for the first time, these tables additionally include a measure of the educational 
‘value added’ by a school to its pupils.  This paper provides the first large scale analysis 
of the likely impact of the new value added performance indicator on the rankings of 
schools in the resulting league tables, and investigates its effect on both schools’ 
behaviour and parents’ ability to choose the right school for their child. 
 
The UK value added performance indicator (PI) essentially measures the progress of a 
school’s pupils, relative to the national average, between the ages of 14 and 16.  Pre-
2002, the indicators provided alternative measures of pupils’ attainment in the national 
exams sat by 16 year olds (GCSEs and GNVQs).  Such indicators, based on raw test 
results, have been criticised on the grounds that they may be measuring differences in 
schools’ intakes as well as differences in their performance.  The value added indicator 
incorporates a proxy for intake (performance at age 14), and hence should be better able 
to isolate the actual performance of a school with regard to the educational progress made 
by its pupils between the ages of 14 and 16.  As we show, the rankings of schools are 
sensitive to which type of indicator is used to measure performance. 
 
But why do rankings matter?  Annual school league tables were introduced in the UK as 
part of the introduction of the quasi market in education.  We shall consider two 
implications of possible changes in school ranking positions for the working of this 
market.  First, league tables provide data on relative school performance which in turn 
should enable informed parental choice.  If it is the case that the publication of the new 
value added PI alters those rankings, how informative have previous league tables been?  
Second, how may the schools react to such a change in ranking position: by improving 
performance or improving league table position?  We discuss the incentives created by 
the alternative types of indicator and show how their publication may have undesired 
consequences in terms of behavioural response.   2
 
Our analysis employs a national dataset of matched exam results, recently released by the 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES), which includes the results of the cohort of 
pupils who sat Key Stage 3 (KS3) exams at age 14 in 1997, and GCSE (or equivalent) 
exams at age 16 in 1999.  We restrict our analysis to English state maintained secondary 
schools, for which we have data on over half a million pupils.  Using this dataset we have 
replicated five performance indicators, which have been or will be published in the UK.  
In particular, we focus on the key pre-2002 PI, the percentage of pupils gaining at least 
five GCSEs or equivalent at grade C or above (%5A*-C), and the new value added 
indicator (VAcap).  At a national level, we investigate the relationships between both the 
indicators themselves and the rankings which result.  We then focus on one LEA, Bristol, 
and show to what extent school positions in the league tables are sensitive to the PI 
employed. 
 
We find a low degree of correlation between %5A*-C and VAcap and the resulting 
rankings, both at national and local level.  This is reflected in the degree to which Bristol 
schools’ ranking positions change when different PIs are employed.  We conclude that 
value added does provide a more accurate measure of school performance and hence 
should help parental choice.  We provide evidence, however, which suggests that a single 
PI, representing a school average value added score, may not be sufficiently informative. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the use of performance 
indicators in the UK education sector.  In section 3, we focus on specific types of PI and 
the incentives created by their publication.  In section 4 we present evidence using our 
replication of the UK PIs, both at national level and for Bristol Local Education 
Authority (LEA).  Section 5 concludes. 
   3
2  Performance Indicators in the UK Education Sector 
 
The UK education sector is large and complex.  In 2001 there were over 400,000 Full 
Time Equivalent teachers and 8.4 million pupils in 25,760 schools (of which 7% are 
independent) (Burgess et al 2001).  Each pupil receives at least 15,000 hours of 
compulsory ‘treatment’ (Fitz-Gibbon 2000).  Until recently education has been treated as 
a procedural organisation with concomitant emphasis on the role of professionalism.  
Now it is subject to relatively high levels of public monitoring.  There are two main 
systems for measuring performance in education in the UK, OFSTED reports
1 and the 
publication of summary performance indicators. 
 
PIs appeared as part of the introduction of quasi-market forces in education following the 
Education Reform Act of 1988 (Le Grand 1991; Glennerster 1991).  The basic principles 
on which this original reform was based are still present in the current education system: 
local management of schools, with devolved budgets calculated on a per-capita basis, 
overlapping catchment areas and open enrolment.  In order to maintain resource levels a 
school must attract sufficient pupil numbers; the overlapping catchment areas create the 
potential for competition for pupils which should drive up the quality of provision.  
Parental choice of school is informed by the annual publication of performance 
indicators, now commonly referred to as the league tables. 
 
Currently two key indicators are published: absences (authorised and unauthorised) and 
pass rates at GCSE.  There is evidence of manipulation of the former by schools through 
the reclassification of truancy to be ‘excused absences’ (Fitz-Gibbon 1996).  With regard 
to the latter, data is now published in four categories: the percentage of a school’s pupils 
gaining at least 5 grade A* - C passes, the percentage gaining at least 5 A* - G, the 
percentage who pass no GCSEs and the average point score.
2  The first three of these are 
examples of target indicators, and we shall discuss the incentives created by such 
                                                 
1 See Burgess et al (2002) for more on OFSTED reports. 
2 For further information, go to http://www.dfes.gov.uk/performancetables/ .   4
performance measures in education in more detail below.  From 2002 a value added 
measure for each school will additionally be published.  The key target indicator, i.e. the 
one to which most attention is paid, is the percentage of pupils gaining 5 or more GCSE 
passes at grades A* - C (perhaps because this is the minimum requirement for 
continuation of study).  Out of the current indicators, therefore, it is this one which we 
concentrate on in this paper, comparing it to alternative measures of value added, both in 
terms of the incentives created and the different rankings which are produced. 
 
There are usually various, non mutually exclusive, aims of any performance monitoring 
system.  In the UK education sector, the aim of the publication of summary PIs is 
generally considered to be twofold: to improve the performance of individual schools, 
thereby raising standards in education, and to provide information on individual school 
performance in order that parental choice is better informed.  Of course the two are linked 
through the working of the quasi market.
3  Any one PI will be at best an imperfect 
summary measure of the complex multiple goals facing a school; indeed, some of these 
goals or tasks may be inherently unmeasurable (Dixit 1999).  So any single PI will only 
measure a specific subset of tasks.  This has consequences regarding possible undesired 
behavioural responses of self-interested schools.  As we discuss below, the specific 
responses depend on the actual PI employed or, more specifically, published. 
 
We now consider the distinct incentives created by first target indicators and then 
alternative measures of value added.  What we concentrate on is the perverse or 
undesired behavioural responses to the publication of such performance indicators.  We 
are not suggesting that desired responses have not also been induced.  Indeed, it is 
certainly the case that performance in the UK education sector – as measured by raw 
exam scores – has improved since the introduction of the quasi-market and the 
publication of the first league tables.  It is, however, difficult to isolate which element(s) 
of such a huge programme of reform has had an impact on outcomes (Burgess et al 
                                                 
3 There is a parallel here with the use of report cards in some US states (Ladd and Walsh 2002).  Published 
performance data is increasingly being used to achieve an improvement in US school performance without 
increasing overall levels of spending (Figlio 2001).  Indeed, in January 2002 President Bush signed the “No 
Child Left Behind” Education Bill into law.  This mandates the use of accountability systems based on 
student test performance (Cullen and Reback 2002).   5
2002).  Bradley et al (2000) provide evidence of the impact of the use of PIs in the UK 
education market; Hoxby (2001) of their impact in the US. 
 
3  Alternative Performance Indicators and Incentives Created 
 
(a)  Target Indicators 
 
Target indicators have so far been the most commonly employed type of PI in education.  
They represent the “% > X” criterion in reporting (Fitz-Gibbon and Thymms 2002).  So 
in the UK, for example, the key indicators include the percentage of a school’s pupils 
gaining at least 5 A* - C grades at GCSE (or equivalent, see below); in the US, various 
target indicators are published in different states: see Figlio and Page (2001) for details 
on the Florida scheme.  As Fitz-Gibbon and Thymms point out, the “% > X” criterion 
introduces an arbitrary dichotomy into continuous data.  Moreover, this dichotomy – the 
X – is measured in terms of raw output such as test scores.  It is this feature that creates 
the particular forms of gaming associated with target indicators.  Of course, it should be 
remembered that it is the publication of such indicators that creates the incentive to game: 
the use of such performance measures as an internal management tool should be treated 
quite separately (Thomas 1998; Saunders 1999). 
 
Three main responses to such target indicators have been identified.  The evidence of 
such behaviour is primarily anecdotal.  First, whenever an arbitrary dichotomy is 
introduced, it will focus agents’ attention on the borderline (Fitz-Gibbon 1996).  So, 
given that a key performance target in the UK is the percentage of children achieving 5 or 
more GCSE passes graded A* - C, we may expect schools to shift their activities or target 
their resources to pupils who are expected to just miss the target in the absence of (extra) 
intervention.  This may be to the detriment of pupils at either end of the ability 
distribution in terms of the resources allocated to them and may or may not be welfare 
improving.  It certainly seems to be a distortion of the activities of teachers from what 
they would do in the absence of such a target and provides one example of ‘measure   6
fixation’ as discussed by Smith (1995) (Fitz-Gibbon 1997).  Examples of such behaviour 
include the use of volunteer helpers with weaker students; strategic mentoring by 
teachers; after-school coaching and holiday revision courses (West and Pennell 2000).  
Such practices may be employed in general if attendance on the course is compulsory.  If, 
however, this is not the case, the incentive would be to remove weak students from the 
course (Fitz-Gibbon 1996).  Again, there is anecdotal evidence from the UK that schools 
are removing weak students from GCSE courses and putting them into GNVQ 
equivalents (Times Educational Supplement 2002).
4 
 
Second, there may be the incentive to reclassify weak students in order that they are not 
eligible for sitting the tests that are the subject of the target indicator.  Figlio and Getzler 
(2002) and Cullen and Reback (2002) both provide evidence of such practices in the US.  
Since the signing of the No Child Left Behind Act states must design accountability 
systems based on the fraction of students attaining a certain level in reading and 
mathematics (Figlio and Getzler 2002).  As well as creating incentives to ‘teach to the 
test’, schools have the incentive to reclassify weak students into the special education 
categories that are exempt from such mandatory testing.  In the UK, there is some 
indirect evidence that the publication of league tables created the incentive to exclude 
certain types of pupils from the school (not just from sitting certain exams as in the US).  
Gillborn (1996) quoted in West and Pennell (2000) reports a tripling of permanent 
exclusions in the three year period from 1993/94 (the first league tables were published in 
1992).  Gerwitz et al (1995) introduce the term ‘constructive exclusion’ to describe ways 
in which schools may put pressure on certain children in order that they leave 
‘voluntarily’ (West and Pennell (2000)).  See also Wilson (2001) for a longer discussion 
of the issue of constructive exclusion and its parallels with involuntary disenrolment from 
health care service providers. 
 
Third, schools now have the incentive to also exclude weak students ex ante, i.e. to 
engage in selection or cream skimming at the point of admission (Wilson 2001).  This is 
                                                 
4 The DfES has calculated a rate of equivalence between GCSE and GNVQ for the purposes of the PI.  For 
example, one full intermediate GNVQ is worth 4 GCSE passes at grade A*-C.  See 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/performancetables/vap_01/docD.shtml for further details.   7
one consequence of the use of a raw output measure of performance, from which it 
follows that, for the same quality of education received, the better the input, i.e. the 
higher the ability of children admitted to the school, the better the output and hence the 
higher the school’s relative position in the league tables.  The deregulation of school 
admissions procedures as part of the 1988 reform package gave locally managed schools 
greater discretion over which pupils they admitted.  Gerwitz et al (1995), Whitty et al 
(1998) and West and Pennell (2000) all discuss ways in which a school can design the 
procedure in order that only certain types of pupils (and parents) are attracted to the 
school.  These include the use of complicated admissions forms and the use of pre-
admission interviews.  In 2002 the highest achieving comprehensive school in England (it 
scored 100% at 5 A* - C or over) was reprimanded by the Local Government 
Ombudsman for its pre-admissions interview policy (Cassidy 2002).  Coopers’ Company 
and Coborn School is a faith school and is therefore allowed to interview prospective 
pupils only to ascertain their religious commitment.  It was additionally asking questions 
about their hobbies and where they lived, which was seen as potentially forming part of a 
non-faith based selection procedure. 
 
Finally, note that the second and third responses to target indicators described above are 
both ways of altering who takes the relevant tests (see Meyer (1997) for additional 
‘creaming’ strategies).  This matters since who takes the test is correlated with measured 
performance (raw output), i.e. a target PI doesn’t explicitly account for heterogeneity in 
any population of students, so the school has the incentive to tailor the population to 
improve its indicator.  It follows, therefore, that one way to reduce the incentive for such 
behaviour is for the indicator itself to better account for such heterogeneity.
5  This is one 
argument supporting the introduction of value added measures of school performance.  
Before we consider the incentives created by such measures, however, it is worth 
discussing what we actually mean by the term itself.  As we shall show, the way value 
added is defined and/or measured has implications for the incentives thereby created. 
 
                                                 
5 There is a parallel here with the use of risk adjusted capitation payments in health care systems (Wilson 
2001).   8
(b)  Value Added 
 
An alternative performance indicator is a school level measure of ‘value added’.  The aim 
of such a PI is to isolate the impact of the school on the progress made by its pupils.  We 
usually consider value added in terms of the progress made, or change in performance of, 
one cohort of pupils across successive time periods.  In the UK, for example, the value 
added PI is a measure of the relative change in performance of pupils between Key Stage 
3 and GCSE (exams sat by all pupils at ages 14 and 16 respectively).  We therefore 
concentrate on this formulation.  This notion of the value added within the same cohort 
through time builds on the economic definition of the term.  For economists, ‘value 
added’ is used to describe the difference in value between the materials ‘bought in’ and 
the finished product, i.e. it measures the value added by the process of production.  The 
term was adopted by educationalists interested in the value added by the education 
production process (see Saunders (1999) for a discussion of the history of its use).  To 
investigate the alternative ways educational value added may be defined, and its 
implications, consider the following education production function (taken from Ladd and 
Walsh (2002, page 3)): 
 
Ait = lAit-1 + atSt + btFit + eit               (1) 
 
where Ait, Ait-1 represents the achievement of student i in year t and year t-1 respectively; 
St is a vector of school characteristics; Fit a vector of measurable family background 
characteristics and eit the random error term. 
 
St represents the impact of the school on the change in pupil performance between the 
two time periods, once we account for prior attainment and family background 
characteristics.  In his formulation, Meyer (1997) talks in terms of hs, the total school 
performance parameter.  Two points should be noted at this stage.  First, both St and hs 
are absolute measures.  Meyer (1997), however, employs what he calls the conditional 
mean format to transform educational value added into a relative concept.  Indeed, in 
contrast with the economic use of the term, educational value added is generally   9
considered relative to some benchmark.  We discuss this in the context of the PI 
published in the UK below.  Second, there are issues surrounding both the inclusion of Ft 
and what characteristics such a vector should contain.  We do not consider these issues 
here because the UK calculation of value added does not incorporate any such 
explanatory variables.  For more on this, see Thomas and Mortimer (1996 ); Meyer 
(1997); Goldstein (2001); Fitz-Gibbon and Thymms (2002;); Ladd and Walsh (2002). 
 
We can isolate the impact of the school in greater detail, at least in theory.  Ladd and 
Walsh (2002) point out that the vector St includes factors that are both within and outside 
school control.  Reconsider the education production function (again, from Ladd and 
Walsh (2002, page 3)), which now splits St into exogenous and endogenous factors: 
 
Ait = lAit-1 + aRtRt + Et + btFit + eit              (2) 
 
where Rt is a vector of factors outside the control of the school and Et a measure of the 
effectiveness of the school’s staff and administration.  Rt may include the exogenously 
determined resource levels and school composition, for example. 
 
Again, several points should be noted (Ladd and Walsh 2002).  First, the true value added 
by a school’s environment should only comprise the change in performance that can be 
attributed to factors endogenous to the school, represented here by Et.  In Meyer’s (1997) 
terms, this is the measure of intrinsic school performance.  Second, one implication of 
this formulation of the education production function is that it is not possible to measure 
the intrinsic performance (or effectiveness) of a school without controlling for resource 
levels.  This way of calculating value added is therefore sympathetic to the original 
economic definition of the term.  As we shall see, however, in practice, resource levels 
are generally not included in educational value added calculations.  Indeed, it may be 
difficult to specify the exogenously determined level of resource.  As Ladd and Walsh 
state, there is a further difficulty in separating the endogenous from the exogenous 
elements of a school’s environment.  Specifically, to what degree are we able to consider   10
school composition as exogenous, given that peer group is one factor in neighbourhood 
and/or school choice decisions? 
 
Perhaps whether or not we actually want to separate the exogenous from the endogenous 
elements of school environment depends on what the resulting performance indicator is 
trying to capture.  More specifically, the alternative PIs may be applicable to the 
objectives of the different actors in the education market.  The parent wants to choose the 
school which maximises his child’s educational achievement, broadly defined.  The total 
school performance parameter is hence relevant: the parent is interested in the whole 
package: teacher effects, resource levels and peer group.  The government, however, is 
more concerned with improving performance for a given level of resource, hence the 
measure of intrinsic school performance is relevant, as that better isolates school (teacher 
plus administration) effectiveness. 
 
So the term value added can be used to describe a range of measures of school 
performance, each of which capture distinct elements of the education production 
process.  How does the above analysis relate to how value added PIs are actually 
calculated in practice?  The next section describes how value added is calculated in the 
context of the secondary education market in the UK; for descriptions of alternative US 
state measures, see Ladd and Walsh (2002) and Figlio and Page (2001). 
 
Value Added: UK Calculation 
 
A school level measure of value added is published for the first time in the 2002 
secondary school performance tables.  This PI provides information on the progress made 
by one cohort of pupils between the ages of 14 and 16.  All pupils sit Key Stage 3 (KS3) 
exams at the age of 14 in English, maths and science.  At the age of 16, the end of 
compulsory schooling, they take their GCSE and/or GNVQ exams.  In order to calculate 
value added, all pupils are categorised into one of 18 bands depending on the mean score 
they attained at KS3 across the three subjects.  This provides the input measure for the 
value added calculation.  The output score is total GCSE (or equivalent GNVQ) points.    11
The median output score is computed for each KS3 band: this is the expected outcome 
for all pupils within that input band.  Each pupil’s total GCSE score is then compared 
with the median point score for all pupils in the same category.  If it is equal to the 
median, they have gained zero value added; a positive value added implies a higher than 
expected score, given KS3 performance, while negative value added suggests a lower 
than expected performance at GCSE.  A school level measure is then calculated by taking 
the mean of individual pupils’ value added scores, so a positive value added PI indicates 
that, on average, the school’s pupils have performed better than expected at GCSE, given 
their KS3 results.
6  The published PI is actually centred around 100 and not 0, 
presumably to avoid confusion about the meaning of a ‘negative’ value added score.  In 
fact, what is published in the performance tables is a variant on this basic method: the 
output score – and hence the value added calculation – is capped at the eight best GCSE 
results or equivalent. 
 
We discuss the particular implications of both versions of the value added PI below, but 
first it is useful to consider this method of calculating value added with reference to the 
preceding discussion.  The UK educational value added PI employs value added as a 
relative concept.  Family and/or background characteristics are not controlled for, nor is 
there any attempt to isolate exogenous from endogenous school effects and hence there is 
no consideration of efficiency in the education production process.  Of course, much of 
the departure from the theoretical ideal outlined above is simply due to practical data 
limitations.  What this PI does provide is a measure of total school performance; it may 
therefore be particularly suited to the issue of parental choice of school.  Moreover, given 
that now prior attainment is explicitly accounted for, the new PI provides a more accurate 
measure of the impact of the school environment than the target indicator which uses just 
raw test scores. 
 
Even if we put to one side the arguments for and against the inclusion of explanatory 
variables other than prior attainment, issues arise regarding the publication of such a 
                                                 
6 Go to http://www.dfes.gov.uk/statistics/DB/PER/p0313/index.html for further information on the value 
added calculation.   12
summary measure of total school performance.  In the next section we therefore consider 
the various alternatives, focusing in particular on the incentives created by them. 
 
Value Added: Alternative Measures and Incentives Created 
 
We have so far discussed two variants employed in practice (with reference to the UK): 
the basic value added calculation and the one which caps the output measure at the best 
eight exam scores.  Let us now consider the incentives created by these alternatives.  
Recall that it is the publication of such indicators that may create incentives to game the 
system and that the responses to their publication depend on the actual PI employed. 
 
By definition, a general feature of any value added measure is the inclusion of a measure 
of an input score.  Ceteris paribus, the lower the input score, the higher the value added.  
It follows, therefore, that one incentive created by the publication of such indicators is to 
depress the input score used.  So in the UK, following the publication of the 14-16 value 
added PI, schools will have the incentive to depress their Key Stage 3 scores as this 
provides one way to boost their position in the value added performance table.  Crucially, 
currently, the input score is internal to the school and hence is within its control.  As Fitz-
Gibbon (1997) points out, this provides one argument for using an alternative, 
exogenous, input score: in the UK this would mean using the results from the Key Stage 
2 tests, taken by pupils at age 11 prior to starting secondary school. 
 
The choice of output score also has an impact on the calculation of value added.  Let us 
consider the alternatives, each of which may be used to formulate a school level PI of 
mean value added across its pupil population.  We first consider measures which are 





This was the output used in the DfES pilots for value added, with the method described 
above.  As Fitz-Gibbon (1997) states, such a total measure reflects the teaching effort   13
across all subjects.  There may, however, be a confusion between quality and quantity: 
the incentive is to put students through more exams in order to boost the indicator. 
 
Average Score Across All Subjects 
 
Using average score as the output measure avoids the quantity / quality confusion from 
using total score: the two are only equivalent when all students take the same number and 
combination of subjects (Fitz-Gibbon 1997).  Now the school has the incentive not to put 
students in for exams if a good result cannot be guaranteed. 
 
Average Score Across a Subset of Subjects 
 
Given the wide range of subjects taken at GCSE and GNVQ, a more accurate measure of 
relative school performance may be one which uses only those subjects taken by all 
pupils – the core curriculum.  This will provide only a partial measure of school or 
teacher effort.  Moreover, any measure which only incorporates the results from a subset 
of subjects will create an incentive to concentrate on maximising the results of those 
which count.  This distortion of effort can be thought of as a form of ‘tunnel vision’ 
(Smith 1995), concentrating only on the subjects relevant for the indicator (Fitz-Gibbon 
1997). 
 
Total Score, Capped at Eight Best Results 
 
As stated above, this is the value added measure to be published in the UK secondary 
school league tables from 2002.  This formulation avoids the problem of distortion of 
effort towards a particular subset of subjects as the eight best can be any from the full 
range of subjects offered.  There is no longer an incentive to enter students for as many 
subjects as possible: indeed, there is no incentive to enter students for more than eight: 
now the incentive is to maximise the scores of each pupil in each of the exams he is 
entered for, up to the cap.  This measure therefore gets round the quantity versus quality 
issue, without being subject specific.  There may be an incentive to distort effort away 
from the top end of the ability distribution, however, due to the imposition of the cap.  In   14
effect, there is a parallel here with the target indicator: capping the value added measure 
at the eight best scores introduces an arbitrary dichotomy into continuous data and thus 
focuses schools’ attention on the borderline.  The incentive now is to focus effort on 
those students who may not get eight (good) GCSEs in the absence of extra intervention.  
This may be to the detriment of those students particularly at the top of the ability 
distribution: if a student is expected to get eight good passes, there is now no incentive to 
improve her position beyond that point. 
 
Subject Level Differences and Differential Effectiveness 
 
All the indicators we have so far discussed employ an output score based on some 
aggregation across subjects in order to calculate the school mean value added.  As Fitz-
Gibbon and Thymms (2002) point out, the use of such aggregate measures may actually 
confuse or hide two issues.  First, there may be differences in the value added across 
different subjects, and second there may be differences in the value added by the same 
school to pupils at different points in the ability distribution: in other words, a school 
mean value added PI will not encapsulate any degree of differential effectiveness in 
school performance (Goldstein 2001; Thomas1998). 
 
First consider the incentives created by the publication of an aggregate measure, as 
opposed to subject level value added indicators.  The publication of such a measure, 
which hides between-subject differences, creates the incentive to keep students out of 
difficult subjects and/or difficult syllabuses or exam boards (Fitz-Gibbon 1997).  For this 
to be a problem, there needs to be systematic differences in performance (output score) 
across different subjects.  Fitz-Gibbon and Thymms (2002) provides evidence that such 
differences do exist.  Such an incentive has knock-on effects in terms of what students go 
on to take at A-level.  For example, if it is the case that it is easier for a student to attain a 
certain score in English GCSE than in maths, the publication of an aggregate PI (value 
added or target) may mean fewer students are entered for maths.  Hence fewer will go on 
to study maths at A-level.  This then creates a wider problem if the economy needs more   15
mathematicians.  In the following section we provide evidence that systematic differences 
do exist between pupils’ performance in English, maths and science at GCSE. 
 
Second, how informative is school mean value added?  Recall that a school’s value added 
PI is calculated by taking the mean of its pupils’ individual value added scores.  It hence 
gives the average value added by the school (relative to the national expected outcomes).  
Alternatively, we can consider this PI as telling us the value added by the school to the 
educational attainment of the average pupil.  Such an aggregate measure is consequently 
not able to provide information on any degree of differential effectiveness in school 
performance (Goldstein 2001; Thomas 1998), i.e. it may hide differences in the value 
added by a school to different groups of pupils.  In what follows, we focus on possible 
differences across the ability distribution: see Thomas (1998) for more on differential 
effectiveness across alternative groupings (with regard to gender, ethnicity, income, for 
example). 
 
Consider that a school has a range of pupils of differing abilities.  It may be the case that 
the school is particularly effective – creates high value added – for the low ability pupils, 
while not performing so well for those at the high end of the ability distribution, or vice 
versa.  The publication of a PI based on school level mean value added hides such 
differences.  Why does this matter?  Recall that one aim of the publication of such 
performance indicators is to help the parents make an informed choice regarding the best 
school for their child.  If it is the case that schools exhibit a large degree of differential 
effectiveness with respect to ability, such PIs are only informative to the parents of the 
“average” child.  If parents have some information regarding their own child’s ability, 
they can only make an informed choice if they know how effective a particular school is 
for children of that ability.  If, however, schools are consistently effective across the 
ability range (or parents have no knowledge of their child’s ability), then the mean value 
added PI provides sufficient information to all parents.  Below we present some 
preliminary evidence on the extent of differential effectiveness by ability in a subset of 
English secondary schools. 
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In summary, the publication of performance indicators may lead to unintended and/or 
undesired behavioural responses.  The incentives created, and hence the responses 
induced, depend on which PI is employed.  One aim of the publication of such indictors 
is to provide information to parents in order for them to exercise choice in the education 
market.  The extent to which schools’ positions in the resulting performance tables are 
dependent on the particular PI is hence central to the incentives created by its publication.  
There is evidence that alternative indicators do lead to different rankings (Thomas and 
Mortimer 1996; Thomas 1998; Figlio and Page 2001).  The next section adds to this body 
of evidence. 
 
4  Evidence from the English Secondary Education Market 
 
The dataset we employ for this analysis is one of the national matched exam datasets 
recently released by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES).  These datasets 
contain the matched exam results of pupils for Key Stage 3 and GCSE/GNVQ, national 
exams usually sat at the ages of 14 and 16 respectively.  Here we present results for the 
1997 – 1999 cohort.  We restrict our analysis to state maintained schools in England (see 
Atkinson and Wilson (2003a) for more details on the dataset).  Summary statistics are 
presented in Table 1.  We have data on over half a million pupils in 3,129 schools, 89% 
of which are comprehensive.  Table 2 shows the average results in each of the exams by 
gender.  At Key Stage 3 (KS3), girls outperform boys in English, while boys narrowly 
outperform girls in science and maths.  By GCSE, girls come out on top by 5 points on 
average, equivalent to an additional GCSE grade C (see Atkinson and Wilson (2003b) for 
more on the widening gender gap in English secondary schools). 
 
Using this dataset we have re-created five of the performance indicators used in the 
English secondary schools performance tables: 
 
(1) Percentage of pupils gaining at least 5 GCSEs at grade C and above (%5A*-C) 
(2) Average point score at GCSE (APS)   17
(3) Value added between KS3 and GCSE (VA) 
(4) Value added between KS3 and GCSE, capped at the best 8 exam results (VAcap) 
(5) Average point score at GCSE, capped at the best 8 exam results (APScap) 
 
(1) is the pre-2002 key target indicator; (2) is an additional output-based indicator; (3) is 
the value added measure employed in the DfES pilot schemes, calculated using the 
method described above; (4) is the value added PI which is to be published from 2002, 
using a capped output score.  Because of this, the published average point score PI is now 
also to be capped, i.e. (1), (4) and (5) will all be included in the performance tables from 
2002. 
 
We examine three questions: 
 
(i)  What are the relationships between the alternative PIs?  In particular, between 
%5A*-C and VAcap? 
(ii)  How sensitive are schools’ positions in the performance tables to the use of 
these alternatives? 
(iii)  How informative is a school mean value added PI?  Does such aggregation 
hide differences either at subject level or across the ability distribution? 
 
Comparison of Alternative Performance Indicators 
 
Consider Table 3, which shows the correlations between the five performance indicators 
using the national dataset.  The key point to note is the low degree of correlation between 
the two different types of indicator, i.e. between the output based and the value added 
measures of performance: 0.3641 between VAcap and %5A*-C, for example.  We 
investigate this further below.  As expected, the three output based PIs are highly 
correlated, as are the two value added indicators.  Note that there is not perfect 
correlation between the two value added PIs, suggesting that the introduction of the cap 
does have some impact.  In Table 4 we split the pupil population into deciles based on 
KS3 performance and look at the correlation between VA and VAcap at different points   18
in the distribution.  The degree of correlation decreases as we move up the deciles, i.e. the 
two measures diverge, suggesting that the imposition of the cap may indeed provide the 
scope for specific incentives, not found with the basic VA measure, to distort effort away 
from the top end of the ability distribution. 
 
So there is a lack of correlation between the output based and the value added measures 
of performance.  In order to investigate this point further we focus on the relationship 
between the key pre-2002 performance indicator, %5A*-C, and the new indicator, 
VAcap.  Consider Figure 1, in which each dot represents a secondary school and which 
illustrates the lack of relationship between the two indicators.  In Figure 2 the same data 
is shown.  Now, however, the schools are represented by the numbers 1 – 5.  We 
calculated the mean KS3 score for each school and split the resulting distribution into 
quintiles, where 1 is the lowest and 5 the highest.  The numbers 1 – 5 therefore proxy the 
relative average ability of each school’s pupils at age 14.  And now a clear pattern 
emerges: the schools which achieve the highest percentage of pupils gaining at least 5 
GCSEs at grade C or above are consistently represented by the number 5, while the 
highest achievers in terms of VAcap show a spread of numbers across the KS3 quintiles.  
There is a high correlation between performance at 14 and at 16; output based PIs such as 
%5A*-C cannot distinguish between the two.  Of course this provides one argument for 
the introduction of VAcap as a more accurate measure of school performance. 
 
Comparison of Alternative Ranking Positions 
 
Let us now consider the relationships between the rankings of schools which result from 
the use of the alternative performance indicators.  We do this in two ways.  First we 
created a national ranking, 1 – 3129, for each of our replicated PIs.  The correlations 
between these rankings are presented in Table 5a.  Given that performance tables, and 
hence school rankings, are generally presented for individual LEAs, however, we also 
created rankings tables for each LEA and then calculated the weighted average (based on 
pupil numbers), again for each of the five PIs.  Table 5b shows the correlations between 
those rankings.  In fact the two methods provide similar results.  Not surprisingly, there is   19
a similar picture between the resultant rankings as there is between the PIs which give 
rise to them.  In particular, there is a consistent lack of correlation between the rankings 
based on the two different types of indicator (output based and value added): 0.4067 
between rankVAcap and rank%5A*-C, for example.  This suggests that the positions of 
schools in the league tables will change depending on which PI is employed, i.e. that 
relative school performance is sensitive to whether the basis for measurement is output or 
value added.  We show this to be the case at LEA level below. 
 
First, it is interesting to investigate further the relationship between the two key ranking 
systems at national level, as we did above for the underlying indicators.  Consider Figure 
3.  Here we plot rankVAcap against rank%5A*-C, with the highest ranking schools being 
the furthest from the origin.  This figure further illustrates the lack of relationship 
between the two bases for ranking performance.
7  In Figure 4 we replace the dots with 
numbers 1 – 5, representing school KS3 mean quintiles, as in Figure 2.  And again a clear 
pattern emerges: the best performing schools according to rank%5A*-C are those 
represented by number 5, the worst by number 1, i.e. those schools which achieve a high 
position in the current league tables are generally those drawn from the highest quintile of 
our proxy for ability (mean KS3).  If we consider the best performing (highest ranked) 
schools in terms of rankVAcap, however, there is a good spread of 1 – 5.  The 
implication is that ranking schools on the basis of raw output may ‘flatter’ those with a 
high KS3 mean and do the reverse for those with a low KS3 mean; such rankings may in 
fact reflect differences in ‘input’ or ability rather than differences in actual school 
performance.  Rankings based on value added account for such heterogeneity across 
school populations and as such create a more level playing field: Figure 4 shows that it is 
possible for schools to achieve a high ranking on the basis of their value added regardless 
of their position in the KS3 distribution. 
 
So what is the likely impact of the introduction of the new value added performance 
indicator on individual schools’ relative positions in the performance tables?  To what 
                                                 
7 Note that for Figures 3 and 4 we have used the national ranking of schools, 1-3129, the results for which 
are given in Table 5a.   20
extent are rankings sensitive to the type of PI employed?  In Table 6a we consider these 
questions with reference to state maintained schools within Bristol Local Education 
Authority.  Using our data we have replicated the 1999 DfES performance table for these 
22 schools for the key target indicator %5A*-C and have also calculated the rankings that 
would have resulted from the use of both VA and VAcap in that year.
8  Table 6a also 
provides information on the admissions policy of each school (comp = comprehensive; 
sel = selective (grammar)) as well as religious denomination.  All state maintained 
schools in Bristol are co-educational. 
 
As we would expect, given the analysis at national level, there are some differences 
between the rankings created by the use of the two value added PIs.  But these are small 
compared to the differences between either of the value added rankings and that based on 
the target indicator.  Let us concentrate on the comparison between rank%5A*-C and 
rankVAcap.  Some of the movements up and down the performance table are substantial: 
St George Community School moves from 16
th to 4
th when we take account of its pupils’ 
KS3 performance; Hengrove from 19
th to 10
th.  Conversely, Henbury and St Thomas 




nd respectively.  Table 6b shows just how 
little correlation there is between the two ranking systems for Bristol.  It is obviously not 
possible to draw general conclusions or find specific patterns of such movements on the 
basis of one year’s data from one LEA.  What this exercise highlights, however, is just 
how sensitive schools’ relative performance is to the basis for measurement of that 
performance. 
 
In summary, performance indicators, and the rankings which result from their use, are 
heavily dependent on whether or not a measure of input is included, i.e. on whether 
output or value added is the basis for measurement.  There is a systematic relationship 
between performance as measured by the target indicator and average results at Key 
Stage 3, which provides one argument for the use of a value added indicator as a more 
                                                 
8 Our calculations produce identical rankings except that in the DfES table: (i) Brislington is 8
th, Henbury 
7
th; (ii) Brislington and St Thomas More are tied at 8
th; Whitefield, Monks Park and Lawrence Weston tied 
at 12
th; Hengrove and Withywood tied at 19
th.  It should be noted that we were unable to replicate the 
published rankings for average point score.   21
accurate measure of school performance.  League tables based on VAcap should, 
therefore, be more informative to parents choosing which school to send their child, but is 
one, school mean value added indicator sufficiently informative to enable effective 
choice? 
 
How Informative is Aggregate Value Added? 
 
Recall that the use of such an aggregate measure of value added may hide two issues: 
differences in value added across subjects, and differences in the value added by the same 
school to pupils at different points in the ability distribution (Fitz-Gibbon and Thymms 
2002). 
 
First, consider possible differences in subject level value added.  We have calculated a 
school level value added indicator for English, maths and science.  The correlations 
between these and the value added across all subjects are presented in Table 7.
9  The 
generally low results suggest that an aggregate measure may not be able to capture 
differences at subject level.  What simple correlations cannot show, however, is whether 
there is a systematic difference in performance across subjects, which creates the scope 
for the subject level incentives discussed above.  Figure 5 provides some evidence that 
such differences do exist.  GCSE point scores in English, maths and science are plotted 
against Key Stage 3 mean score.
10  Again we are using performance at Key Stage 3 as our 
proxy for ability.  The vertical lines represent the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles of this 
distribution.  There is a consistent pattern: given KS3 performance, it is easier to gain a 
higher score in English than in science or maths.  This is true to a point beyond the 75
th 
percentile.  And science appears systematically ‘easier’ than maths for pupils below the 
median.  If the PI is not subject specific, therefore, the incentive exists to put pupils – of a 
                                                 
9 Two alternatives are presented for each subject.  Given that pupils can sit more than one GCSE in each 
(English Language and English Literature, for example), we calculated value added on the basis of the 
maximum score gained in any English GCSE and the mean score across all English GCSEs if more than 
one was taken.  Similarly for maths and science.  In all cases, the two alternatives are highly correlated. 
10 Note that the maximum score for each subject was used (see footnote 9).  The KS3 mean scores are split 
into the 18 bands used as the input for the DfES value added calculation.   22
wide range of abilities – into English rather than maths or science in order to secure a 
good pass and boost the indicator and resultant ranking position. 
 
Finally, is there any evidence of differential effectiveness across the ability distribution, 
i.e. do schools provide different amounts of value added for different types of children?  
In Figure 6 we present evidence of such differential effectiveness.  For each state 
maintained secondary school in Bristol, we have calculated VAcap across the Key Stage 
3 distribution (split into quintiles in the figure).  There is one line for each school and the 
identifying number is its ranking according to rank%5A*-C.  The lines are not horizontal: 
there is some difference in the value added by each school at different points in the KS3 
distribution (again, our proxy for ability).  School 1 (St Mary Redcliffe and Temple) is 
fairly consistent, as is school 11 (Bedminster Down), so the aggregate measure of 
average value added may be sufficiently informative.  But now consider school 12 
(Whitefield Fishponds Community), whose value added decreases as we move up the 
KS3 distribution; or school 22 (Merrywood), whose value added becomes positive for the 
highest quintile.  The publication of one measure of the average value added by a school 
may in fact hide differences which are relevant to parents when making the choice of 
school for their particular child. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
This paper provides the first large scale analysis of the likely impact of the publication of 
the new value added performance indicator in the English secondary school performance 
tables.  We find a low degree of correlation between output based PIs and value added 
PIs, as well as between the resultant rankings.  The systematic relationship between 
rank%5A*-C and average KS3 score suggests that league tables to date have at least 
partly reflected the ability of a school’s intake (at age 14) as well as providing some 
measure of the impact of school environment on pupil progress.  This adds weight to the 
argument supporting the use of value added as a more accurate basis for the measurement 
of individual school performance, given that it explicitly takes account of the   23
heterogeneity of the pupil population.  Our replication of the Bristol league table 
illustrates just how sensitive schools’ ranking positions may be to the type of PI 
employed, and suggests that we can expect significant movements up and down the 
rankings once performance is measured in terms of value added. 
 
Changes in ranking position will of course create different competitive pressures for 
schools.  The aim is that they respond by improving performance, but the complexity of 
the education production process leaves scope for schools to try and game the system in 
order to simply improve their league table position.  While value added PIs reduce the 
incentives for selection, present when performance is measured solely on the basis of 
output, the imposition of the cap in the UK value added calculation may create the 
incentive for schools to distort effort away from those pupils at the top end of the 
distribution.  A key point to note is that from 2002 the value added PI is to be published 
alongside the existing output based indicators.  Published information on multiple 
outcomes prevents the school from focusing on only one, and may therefore reduce the 
incentive (or ability) to game the subsequently more complex performance monitoring 
system (Ladd 1999; Fitz-Gibbon 1997).  Of course there is a trade off between 
complexity and transparency: the more alternative indicators published, the more difficult 
it becomes for parents to evaluate the information presented to them. 
 
Given that the UK value added calculation provides a measure of total school 
performance it may be particularly suited to the aim of enabling informed parental 
choice.  One school level measure of average value added across the curriculum may not 
be sufficiently informative, however, given our findings on both subject level differences 
and differential effectiveness.  Not all parents have ‘average’ children: in order for 
parents to be effective drivers for improvement in the education market, it is essential that 
they are able to determine which may be the best school for their individual child.  The 
introduction of a value added PI is certainly an improvement on the previous reliance on 
output based indicators: it may, however, be necessary to additionally consider the impact 
of differential value added across different student types. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
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*CTC: City Technology College 
 




Table 2: Key Stage 3 (1997) and GCSE (1999) Results by Gender 
 
  Girls: Mean (s.d.)  Boys: Mean (s.d.)  All Pupils: Mean (s.d.) 
 
KS3 English  4.99 (1.38)  4.34 (1.66)  4.66 (1.56) 
KS3 Maths  4.99 (1.35)  5.06 (1.35)  5.02 (1.35) 




42.55 (17.60)  37.54 (17.74)  40.02 (17.85) 
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Table 3: Correlations of Performance Indicators 
 
  VA  VAcap  %5A*-C  APS  APScap 
VA  1.0000         
VAcap  0.8801  1.0000       
%5A*-C  0.3418  0.3641  1.0000     
APS  0.4884  0.4288  0.9583  1.0000   





Table 4: Correlations of VA vs. VAcap Across Ability Deciles* 
 
All Pupils  0.8761 
 
1  0.9311 
2  0.9154 
3  0.9047 
4  0.8967 
5  0.8799 
6  0.8674 
7  0.8581 
8  0.8234 
9  0.7988 
10  0.7568 
 
* as defined by KS3 score (1 = lowest; 10 = highest) 
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Table 5a: Correlations of Rankings (Based on National Ranking 1-3129) 
 
  RankVA  RankVAcap  Rank%5A*C  RankAPS  RankAPScap 
RankVA  1.0000         
RankVAcap  0.8813  1.0000       
Rank%5A*C  0.3631  0.4067  1.0000     
RankAPS  0.5005  0.4709  0.9594  1.0000   




Table 5b: Correlations of Rankings (Based on Weighted Average of LEA 
Rankings) 
 
  RankVA  RankVAcap  Rank%5A*C  RankAPS  RankAPScap 
RankVA  1.0000         
RankVAcap  0.8478  1.0000       
Rank%5A*C  0.3941  0.4523  1.0000     
RankAPS  0.5463  0.5089  0.9229  1.0000   
RankAPScap  0.4511  0.5097  0.9564  0.9581  1.0000 
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Table 6a: School Rankings: Comparison of Alternative Performance 
Indicators 




Rank%5A*C  RankVA  RankVAcap  Adm  Denom 
St Mary Redcliffe and 
Temple 
1  1  1  comp  C of E 
Cotham  2  4  3  sel  none 
St Bede’s  3  9  7  comp  RC 
St Bernadette  4  6  9  comp  RC 
Fairfield  5  5  2  sel  none 
Ashton Park  6  10  8  comp  none 
Brislington  7  12  13  comp  none 
Henbury  8  21  21  comp  none 
St Thomas More  9  22  22  comp  RC 
Hartcliffe  10  3  5  comp  none 
Bedminster Down  11  18  18  comp  none 
Whitefield Fishponds 
Community 
12  7  6  comp  none 
Monks Park  13  20  19  comp  none 
Lawrence Weston  14  13  12  comp  none 
Lockleaze  15  16  14  comp  none 
St George Community  16  2  4  comp  none 
Portway Community  17  11  16  comp  none 
Speedwell  18  14  11  comp  none 
Hengrove  19  8  10  comp  none 
Withywood  20  17  15  comp  none 
Pen Park  21  19  20  comp  none 




Table 6b: Correlations of Rankings: Bristol LEA (1999) 
 
  RankVA  RankVAcap  Rank%5A*C 
RankVA  1.0000     
RankVAcap  0.9492  1.0000   
Rank%5A*C  0.4195  0.4884  1.0000 
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  MeanVA  VAmaxE  VAmeanE 
MeanVA  1.000     
VAmaxE  0.5768  1.000   




  MeanVA  VAmaxM  VAmeanM 
MeanVA  1.000     
VAmaxM  0.4475  1.000   




  MeanVA  VAmaxS  VAmeanS 
MeanVA  1.000     
VAmaxS  0.4312  1.000   
VAmeanS  0.4204  0.9890  1.000 
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Figure 5: Pupil Performance by Subject 
 
 Key stage 3 Mean Groups
 Maths  English
 Science























2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4













6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5













11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9













15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
14 14 14 14 14 14 14
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
14 14 14 14 14 14 14
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
14 14 14
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16













17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18













20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
20 20 20 20 20 20
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
21 21 21 21 21 21 21
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
22 22 22 22
22 22 22
22